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Congressional Power to Criminalize "Local"




There may still be some people who believe that in recent years the
courts, led by the Supreme Court, have reflected a view of a limited
federal government, specifically of a Congress more limited to its enu-
merated powers than in the view of the older "activist" judges who
arguably reflected a belief in the need for a federal government of more
expansive powers.
A good example of this change of paradigm, one might have
thought, would be judicial interpretation of Congress' authority under
what has come to be known as the Commerce Clause. The Commerce
Clause is part of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Section 8 enu-
merates specific powers of Congress. The Commerce Clause empowers
Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' The final clause of Section
8 empowers Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ... ."2 As origi-
nally written, and as understood from the meaning of its text when writ-
ten, one could have argued that this congressional power was limited to
regulating what had been the levy of tariffs on imports and exports by
the various states against other states. In the Federalist No. 42, James
Madison wrote that "[a] very material object of this power was the relief
of the States which import and export through other States from the
improper contributions levied on them by the latter."3 Or one might have
argued that the term "commerce" itself was limited to the trade and
exchange of goods and transportation for this purpose.4 While perhaps
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1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
2. Id.
3. Tim FEDERALIST No. 42, at 238 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass'n Classics ed., 2009).
4. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv.
101, 112-25 (2001). Justice Thomas endorsed this very position in his concurrence in United
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not sufficient to overturn a line of decisions beginning in 1824 that
endorse a more expansive view of what powers the Commerce Clause
enumerates for Congress,5 one might then have argued for a more lim-
ited view of congressional power.
In its decisions in United States v. Lopez6 and United States v. Mor-
rison,7 it did seem as if the Supreme Court was reining in the reigning
view of the extent of Congress' power. In Lopez, the Court held that the
statute there-which made it a crime for an individual to possess a gun
in a school zone-was beyond the power of Congress because the law
did not (1) regulate any economic activity or (2) contain a requirement
that the possession of the gun have any connection to past interstate
activity or a predictable impact on future interstate activity.8 The law at
issue was a "brief, single-subject statute making it a crime ... to possess
a gun in a school zone."9 In Morrison, Congress had created a federal
civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence. " This
time, Congress made findings that such crimes had an adverse impact on
interstate commerce, and so the Supreme Court limited its unconstitu-
tionality holding to the fact that "like the statute in Lopez, it did not
regulate economic activity."' 1 Lopez had identified three categories of
activity that Congress could regulate under its commerce power: (1) the
use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and things or persons in interstate commerce; and
(3) activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.1 2 Mor-
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), and in his later dissent in
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58-59 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall
wrote of a broad power. For example, he defined "among" as "intermingled with," as well as
something that concerns more than one state. Id. at 194-95. At issue in Gibbons was truly
commerce among the states-whether New York could enact legislation regarding navigable
waters in conflict with congressional legislation. One could argue that much of what Marshall
wrote was not truly part of the holding of the decision. However, one cannot so easily distinguish
the Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), where the Court ruled
that Congress did not exceed its powers under the Commerce Clause when its laws reached the
local production of wheat for home consumption in violation of federal law designed to reduce the
national production of wheat in order to avoid surpluses and control market prices for the wheat
that was sold.
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557) ("Lopez emphasized, however,
that even under our modem, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress'
regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.").
8. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 23-24 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
9. Idat 23; see also Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(I)(A) (Supp. V
1988), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
11. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 25.
12. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
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rison involved only the third category, and the Supreme Court rejected
congressional findings of a substantial effect on interstate commerce,1
3
which the Court held justified its concern, expressed in Lopez, that to
follow Congress' reasoning might endorse the use of the Commerce
Clause "to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between
national and local authority . . . .'"' The Court then held that Congress
cannot "regulate noneconomic, violent ... conduct based solely on that
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce." 5
Although for a short period, the Supreme Court seemingly endorsed
a more limited view of the reach of the Commerce Clause, 6 that view
lasted barely ten years, with a coup de grace administered by none other
than Justice Scalia himself.' 7 In 2005, the Court rendered its decision in
Gonzales v. Raich, holding that the local growth and consumption of
marijuana for personal, medicinal use, while lawful under California
law, was nonetheless unlawful under federal law because Congress had
the power to pass the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA").' 8 The CSA
prohibits the cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana solely
for personal medicinal use because such activities, while clearly local,
and clearly not part of interstate commerce, affect interstate commerce
in the view of Congress.' 9 Congress can, of course, prohibit such activi-
ties as provided for in Wickard v. Filburn and its progeny, and in Lopez
itself."0 In Raich, the Court did not reject or overrule Lopez or Morrison,
but simply distinguished them on their facts, noting that unlike the statu-
tory scheme in Lopez, the statutory scheme in Raich "is at the opposite
end of the regulatory spectrum[,]" being part of "a lengthy and detailed
statute creating a comprehensive framework for regulating the prosecu-
tion, distribution, and possession of five classes of 'controlled sub-
stances.' "21 The Court characterized this scheme as being merely one of
many essential parts of a larger regulation of economic activity that
would be negatively affected unless intrastate activity was regulated.22
13. According to the Court, Congress found that gender-motivated violence in the aggregate
affects interstate commerce by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, engaging in
interstate business, etc. Id. at 615.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 617.
16. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
17. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
18. Id. at 32-33.
19. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
20. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (reciting the three categories of lawful congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause, the third of which was that the activities substantially
affect interstate commerce).
21. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 24.
22. Id. at 24-25; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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Morrison was distinguished on the ground that "it did not regulate eco-
nomic activity. '"23
In his concurrence in Lopez, Justice Thomas, accurately it turns out,
warned of the use of the Commerce Clause for what he perceived to be
state-law issues:
Although I join the majority, I write separately to observe that
our case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the
Commerce Clause .... [I]t seems to me that the power to regulate
"commerce" can by no means encompass authority over mere gun
possession, any more than it empowers the Federal Government to
regulate marriage, littering, or cruelty to animals, throughout the 50
States. Our Constitution quite properly leaves such matters to the
individual States, notwithstanding these activities' effects on inter-
state commerce. Any interpretation of the Commerce Clause that
even suggests that Congress could regulate such matters is in need of
reexamination. 4
In her dissent in Raich, Justice O'Connor found the majority's defi-
nition of "economic" to be so broad that every activity is encom-
passed .2 Though not explicitly answered by the majority opinion, the
question was important: What wasn't an economic activity? The ques-
tion becomes analogous to the discussion of "closed systems" in phys-
ics. Consider a closed box, sealed on all sides. There is some amount of
energy inside that box-stored in the particles inside-but if the seal is
perfect, then no energy can be exchanged with the world outside the
box. This is called a "closed system." But what good is that box to the
outside world, and what good is the outside world to that box, in such a
situation? State economies are sometimes imagined to be like these
closed boxes, but the reality is that in a proper analogy there would be
thousands upon thousands of holes in the box, allowing "energy," i.e.,
money, to flow in and out. While activities within the box are "intra-
state," they eventually connect up with interstate activities with varying
distances. No intrastate activity truly occurs in isolation, because all
intrastate participants are also participants in the interstate economy.
Each dollar you spend in your own state is a dollar you cannot spend in
the interstate economy, and vice versa. What O'Connor was asking,
then, is how separate your intrastate activity must be-how many levels
of abstraction does it need to be removed by-before it is safely
excluded from the Commerce Clause.
In any event, in Raich the Supreme Court returned to its earlier
23. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25.
24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
25. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 64:12211224
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decisions, holding that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power
to regulate the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and people or things in interstate commerce; and
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,26 including
"noneconomic" activity and the federal interest it is supposed to pro-
mote. The Court relied heavily on the decision that set forth the most
expansive view of the power of Congress, Wickard v. Filburn.27 How-
ever, the Court based its decision in Raich on its determination that the
activity at issue-the local production and consumption of marijuana for
medicinal purposes lawful under California law but unlawful under Fed-
eral law-nonetheless bore a sufficient relationship to interstate com-
merce for Congress to have a rational basis in determining there was
such an interstate effect.28
Reading the three decisions together, one can only conclude that
even local, noneconomic activity (one must keep in mind that the Com-
merce Clause is not the Economics Clause) can be found by the
Supreme Court to be subject to congressional regulation under the Com-
merce Clause, so long as at least one of the three Lopez categories of
regulation is found to be present. In other words, the "closed system" of
an intrastate economy is more an illusion than anything else.
A review of recent Eleventh Circuit decisions involving congres-
sional use of the Commerce Clause to criminalize what some might
argue are local, or at least noneconomic, activities reveals that Lopez is
no impediment to approval of a broad interpretation of congressional
power. Thus, often with little discussion, the Eleventh Circuit has rou-
tinely upheld statutes against the Commerce Clause. This article ana-
lyzes decisions in the following areas: the knowing possession of a
firearm, the local possession of stolen property, and sex-offender
registration.
II. KNOWING POSSESSION OF A FIREARM
In Lopez, the issue was whether Congress simply could prohibit the
possession of a firearm when close to a school.29 The statute in question
there, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), made it a federal offense to knowingly
possess a firearm in a school zone.3" Finding that "[t]he Act neither reg-
26. Id. at 16-17.
27. 317 U.S. III (1942).
28. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22 ("In assessing the scope of Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine
whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in
fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding.").
29. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
30. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1988),
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ulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the posses-
sion be connected in any way to interstate commerce[,]" the Supreme
Court held it unconstitutional. 3 Congress also made it a crime for any-
one convicted of a felony, or convicted in any court of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence, to possess a firearm affecting commerce or
to receive a firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate
commerce.3 2 Given that jurisdictional hook, every court in the Eleventh
Circuit that has examined the issue has upheld the constitutionality of
§ 922(g). Nonetheless, defendants have repeatedly and unsuccessfully
challenged the constitutionality of this law, on its face and as applied.
No fewer than seven Eleventh Circuit decisions have addressed the issue
in the past year.33 Facial constitutionality has been uniformly found
since 1996 based on the statute's requirement that the firearm previously
have travelled in interstate commerce.34 Thus, a criminal defendant's
defense on this issue rests on an "as applied" argument, which requires a
lack of proof that the firearm moved in interstate commerce. But what
gun ever fails to travel in interstate commerce? In May of 2009, Repre-
sentative Leo Berman proposed a law to explicitly exclude guns and
ammunition manufactured entirely in Texas from all federal gun laws.
36
In the same year, Montana passed exactly such a law. 37 But, even if the
gunsmith resides solely in that state-e.g., Montana-and sells his guns
only in that state, where did the metals he used come from? What about
invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ("It shall be unlawful for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone.").
31. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (9) (2006).
33. See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205 (1lth Cir. 2010) (noting that
§ 922(g)(9)'s constitutionality has withstood Commerce Clause attack); United States v. Mims,
No. 09-11966, 2010 WL 31722, at *2-3 (11 th Cir. Jan. 7, 2010) (rejecting a facial and as-applied
constitutional attack on § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Charles, No. 09-12684, 2009 WL 5103556,
at *3 (1 lth Cir. Dec. 29, 2009) (rejecting a facial and as-applied constitutional attack on
§ 922(g)(1)); United States v. Dorvilus, No. 09-10197, 2009 WL 4854131, at *10 (1 lth Cir. Dec.
17, 2009) (rejecting a facial and as-applied constitutional attack on § 922(g)(1)); United States v.
McCain, No. 09-11629, 2009 WL 4854126, at *1 (1 th Cir. Dec. 17, 2009) (rejecting a facial
constitutional attack on § 922(g)(1)); United States v, Duncan, No. 08-16825, 2009 WL 4598305,
at *2 n.5 (11 th Cir. Dec. 8, 2009) (rejecting a facial constitutional attack on § 922(g)(1)); United
States v. Battle, 347 F. App'x 478,480 (11 th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a facial constitutional attack on
.§ 922(g)(1)).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Mims, No. 09-11966, 2010 WL 31722, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 7,
2010); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
35. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390 (holding that the government showed that the firearm had
traveled in interstate commerce); United States v. Dorvilus, No. 09-10197, 2009 WL 4854131, at
*10 (11th Cir. Dec. 17, 2009) (holding that the government showed that the firearm was
manufactured outside Florida).
36. Lindsay Landry, Rep. Berman Proposes New Gun Bill, KETKNBc.COM, May 4, 2009,
http://www.ketknbccom/news/rep-berman-proposes-new-gun-bill.
37. Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. COoE ANN. §§ 30-20-101 to -106 (2009).
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the equipment he used in his manufacture? Where did his employees
come from? Where do the guns go? How separate from the interstate
commercial flow need be his manufacturing process?
The statute at issue in Lopez was amended by Congress both to add
prefatory language about the nationwide problem the statute seeks to
address and to require that the firearm possessed in the school zone be
one "that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign
commerce," tracking the language in § 922(g).38 While the Eleventh
Circuit has not addressed this specific issue, 39 given its precedent
regarding § 922(g), there is no reason to believe it would not uphold the
new § 922(q) against a constitutional challenge. Other circuits have con-
sidered the amended § 922(q) and found it constitutional.'
III. MERE LOCAL POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
One defendant has argued that Congress cannot make it a crime for
him simply to possess or receive stolen goods where he "had no involve-
ment in the interstate transportation of the . . . goods."'" The Southern
District of Florida made short work of his argument, noting that the
Eleventh Circuit clearly has rejected the argument that only the interstate
process itself is subject to congressional regulation: "congressional
power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce
includes the power to prohibit their use for harmful purposes, even if the
targeted harm itself occurs outside the flow of commerce and is purely
local in nature. 42
IV. PROTECTION OF MINORS FROM INTERNET PREDATORS
In United States v. Faris, Mr. Faris admittedly used the internet to
solicit minors to engage in sexual activity with him, which would be a
federal criminal offense; however, he argued that the statute making
38. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)-(2) (2006).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320, 1323-25 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying
§ 922(q)(2)(A) without questioning its constitutionality).
40. See, e.g., United v. Nieves-Castafio, 480 F.3d 597, 602 (Ist Cir. 2007) (noting that the
current form of § 922(q) "provide[s] necessary connections to interstate commerce"); United
States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that "[tihis new version of
§ 922(q) . . . incorporates a 'jurisdictional element which would ensure . . . that the firearm
possession in question affects interstate commerce"'); United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037,
1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that § 922(q) "contains language that ensures... that the firearm
in question affects interstate commerce"). But see United States v. Hoffmeyer, No. 00-CR-91-C,
2001 WL 34372871, at *18-22 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 25, 2001) (stating, in dicta, that the new version
of § 922(q) is unconstitutional, notwithstanding the jurisdictional element).
41. United States v. Roque, No. 08-20958-CR, 2009 WL 1117482, at *I (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24,
2009).
42. Id. at *3 n.2 (citing United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11 th Cir. 2009).
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such conduct unlawful4 3 was unconstitutional as applied to him because
his conduct was all local." He said his internet communications, tele-
phone calls, emails and travel routes used in his quest to have sex with a
minor were confined to Florida.45 The Eleventh Circuit rejected his
arguments. The Court's decision may be of note for two reasons. First, it
emphasizes the legal point that mere use of an instrumentality of inter-
state commerce, like a telephone or the internet, even if never "routed
over state lines," does not change the fact that these instrumentalities fall
under the ambit of interstate commerce.46 Second, use of an instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce means the purpose of the use need not itself
be economic.4 7 The law in this regard is well-settled in the Eleventh
Circuit.48
V. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
Congress does not require all convicted felons to register locally. It
does require "sex offenders" to do so under the 2006 Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA").4 9 Sex offenders who
have failed to register as required by 42 U.S.C. § 16913 face criminal
prosecution.50 These requirements apply to sex offenders who have
served whatever prison time they may have been sentenced to and even
apply to sex offenders sentenced only to probation whose probationary
period has expired. 5' As the Eleventh Circuit noted in United States v.
Ambert, the leading-on point-decision in this Circuit, the purpose of
SORNA was to "'protect the public from sex offenders and offenders
against children . . .' by establishing 'a comprehensive national system
for the registration of those offenders.' "52 The constitutionality of
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006), which prohibits using any means of interstate commerce to
knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in "any sexual activity for which
any person can be charged with a criminal offense."
44. United States v. Fais, 583 F.3d 756, 758 (11 th Cir. 2009).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 759.
47. Id. (citing United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11 th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179-40 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (applying the
rationale of Gonzalez v. Raich in holding that an instrumentality of commerce may criminalize an
activity that is both local and non-economic).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16962 (2006). Section 16913 delineates when and how a sex
offender must register under the Act.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). The penalty can include a fine and up to ten years in prison.
§ 2250.
51. For example, in United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009), Ambert had
been convicted in 1975 in California under its Crimes Against Children law and sentenced to five
years probation, but was required by California law and subsequently SORNA to register in
another state if he moved. Id. at 1204. See, e.g., United States v. Griffey, 589 F.3d 1363 (11 th Cir.
2009); United States v. Cardenas, 323 F. App'x 854 (11 th Cir. 2009).
52. Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1205 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006)).
1228 [Vol. 64:1221
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SORNA has been challenged on a number of grounds,53 all of which
have been rejected in this Circuit, 54 but this article will address only the
Commerce Clause challenge. SORNA establishes two categories of sex
offenders subject to prosecution: (1) for those convicted as sex offenders
under federal law and have not traveled in interstate commerce, 5 and
(2) for those that traveled in interstate commerce, regardless of where
they were originally convicted .5 The Eleventh Circuit has not yet con-
sidered the first class of sex offenders who failed to register. It has,
however, considered the second class and, in Ambert, resolved the issue
firmly in favor of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.
In Ambert, the Eleventh Circuit decided the case without reference
to Raich, or even Morrison. In Mr. Ambert's case, as a result of a local
law enforcement investigation into a possible sex offense against a child,
police learned of Ambert's presence in Florida and that he was listed as
having "absconded from California's Sex Offender Registry."57 He was
charged on July 6, 2007 in Florida's court system with failing to register
as a sex offender under Florida law.58 For reasons not apparent from the
decision, Ambert traveled from Florida to California on July 9, 2007 and
returned to Florida on July 11, 2007, which resulted in his being indicted
in September for traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register
under SORNA.59
Ambert challenged SORNA as unconstitutional on its face. The
Eleventh Circuit dispatched this challenge swiftly. Using the Lopez anal-
ysis, the court held that Ambert personally was an instrumentality of
interstate commerce that traveled through interstate channels to and
from California.61 It did not say that he merely used interstate instru-
mentalities-e.g. airlines-but that he himself was such an instrumen-
tality .6 1 The court reiterated the standard that where either of these
principles (channels or instrumentalities) applies, the legislation is
within the Commerce Power, regardless of whether the "targeted harm
itself occurs outside the flow of commerce and is purely local in
53. Among the grounds were (1) excessive delegation of legislative authority, (2) ex post
facto law, (3) substantive and procedural due process, and (4) violations of the sex offender's right
to travel. See Id.
54. Id. at 1206.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(A) (2006).
56. § 2250(a)(2)(B).
57. Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1205-06.
58. Id. at 1205.
59. Id at 1206.
60. Id. at 1210.
61. Id. at 1211.
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nature. ' 62 The court's rationale, however, was not exactly on point. The
court said SORNA is analogous to the statute prohibiting church-based
arson in Ballinger or the Mann Act, which prohibited the transport of
women in interstate commerce for immoral purposes.6 3 However, unlike
those two situations, where the interstate travel was for the purpose of
committing the bad act, in this case, the interstate travel of Ambert was
unrelated to his failure to register. Put differently, SORNA only requires
that the person at some time travel in interstate commerce, not that the
offense be in or affect interstate commerce. The statute at issue in Bal-
linger defines the crimes, then adds as an element that "[t]he circum-
stances referred to in subsection (a) are that the offense is in or affects
interstate or foreign commerce."' The court in Ambert did not necessa-
rily see this distinction, stating "SORNA does no more than employ
Congress' lawful commerce power to prohibit the use of channels or
instrumentalities of commerce for harmful purposes. '"65 While the circuit
courts seem to be uniformly upholding the constitutionality of SORNA
under the Commerce Clause,66 there are those who make a cogent argu-
ment against its constitutionality.67
The court also rejected a challenge to the registration provision of
SORNA6 8 , adopting the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in United States
v. Howell6 9 and relying on the "Necessary and Proper" clause7° and
62. Id. (quoting United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11 th Cir. 2005)). Ballinger
involved the constitutionality of a federal statute that criminalized church-based arson.
63. Id.
64. Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1224 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2002)). As the Ballinger court
noted,
The constitutional issue this case raises is whether the Commerce Clause, found in
Article I, § 8, clauses I and 3 of the United States Constitution, permits Congress to
proscribe the conduct of an arsonist who travels by car on the interstate highways
through four states, apparently for no other purpose than to burn churches to the
ground.
Id. at 1227.
65. Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1211.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. George,
579 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008).
67. See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the
Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGis. 369 (2009). See also Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and
Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element
Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1675 (2002) (proposing a purpose nexus requirement mandating that
the traditional jurisdictional prong of Commerce Clause analysis be conformed both to the
purposes of the applicable statute and the Commerce Clause power itself in light of the diminished
meaningfulness of state-line crossing as an indicator of interstate commerce).
68. Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1211.
69. 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009).
70. U.S. CoNrsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
[Vol. 64:12211230
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Chief Justice Marshall's words in M'Culloch v. Maryland.7' Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit, considering the purposes of SORNA, including the
establishment of a national system to counteract the danger of sex
offenders slipping through the cracks or exploiting a weak state registra-
tion system, found that § 16913, the registration section, "is reasonably
adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce
clause," 72 echoing Chief Justice Marshall's words in M'Culloch: "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional. 73
VI. CONCLUSION
If current law is read all at once, it appears that, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's statement in Morrison that there are limits, the com-
merce power may reach into virtually any aspect of intrastate life. One
can argue, based on Ambert and similar decisions in other circuits, that if
a person has ever travelled between states they may be subject to laws
governing their behavior even if that behavior occurs completely sepa-
rately from that travel (e.g., the registering of sex offenders). Similarly,
one could argue that if a device's manufacture involves components that
ever travelled interstate, or the device moves in interstate commerce, or
the sale of that device will have some collateral impact on interstate
commerce, it will be subject to federal law. Put differently, "[i]f the
Federal Government can regulate growing a half-dozen cannabis plants
for personal consumption (not because it is interstate commerce, but
because it is inextricably bound up with interstate commerce)" then can
"Congress' Article I powers-as expanded by the Necessary and Proper
Clause-have no meaningful limits[?]" 74
71. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
72. Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1212.
73. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
74. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 65 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas put
this in the form of a declaration, not a question.
